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SACRED RAIN ARROW: HONORING THE NATIVE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE OF THE STATES WHILE 
BALANCING THE CITIZENS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Amelia Coates* 
Abstract 
Many states’ histories and traditions are steeped heavily in Native 
American culture, which explains why tribal imagery and symbolism are 
prevalent in official state paraphernalia such as license plates, flags, and 
state seals. Problems arise for states using Native American artwork when a 
citizen takes offense to the religious implications of Native American 
depictions, and objects to having it displayed on any number of items. This 
Comment will examine the likely outcome of cases involving 
Establishment Clause and compelled speech claims arising from Native 
American images and propose a solution for balancing the constitutional 
rights of the citizens while still honoring the states’ rich Native American 
heritage. 
I. Introduction 
States have used Native American imagery in their official state 
paraphernalia for hundreds of years; in fact, some states used these 
depictions when they were only colonies. King Charles I permitted a charter 
to the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1629, which included the authority to 
use a seal portraying an Indian holding an arrow downward to indicate 
peace.1 The current Massachusetts seal, although very different from its 
original, depicts an Algonquin Native American clothed in moccasins and a 
shirt, holding a bow in his right hand and an arrow in his left hand, pointed 
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 1. The History of the Arms and Great Seal of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
WILLIAM FRANCIS GALVIN: SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., http://www.sec. 
state.ma.us/pre/presea/sealhis.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). 
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downward.2 This has been the Massachusetts official state seal since June 4, 
1885, and the seal is also currently displayed on the Massachusetts state 
flag.3 
The Florida state seal, also depicted on its state flag, shows a Native 
American Seminole woman strewing flowers4; the state flag of Kansas 
features Indians hunting American Bison5; the Minnesota state flag and seal 
have an image of an Indian riding on a horse6; Oklahoma’s flag and seal 
exhibits an Osage warrior’s shield and honors more than sixty Native 
American groups.7 More subtle references to Native American culture on 
state memorabilia include an Indian ear of corn on Delaware’s state flag 
and seal8, the red border of Wyoming’s state flag which represents the 
Indians who occupied the land long before the settlers came9, and the 
simple design of New Mexico’s state flag displaying the sun symbol of the 
Zia people.10 
Two states feature Native American imagery on their official state 
license plates: New Mexico and Oklahoma. New Mexico’s license plate 
repeats the same image depicted on its state flag, the Zia sun symbol.11 The 
Oklahoma license plate, which used to display the same buffalo shield 
image used on the state flag and seal, now features the image of deceased 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Id.; The Massachusetts State Flag, NETSTATE, http://www.netstate.com/states/symb/ 
flags/ma_flag.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). 
 3. The Massachusetts State Flag, supra note 2. 
 4. The Florida State Flag, NETSTATE, http://www.netstate.com/states/symb/flags/fl_ 
flag.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). 
 5. The Kansas State Flag, NETSTATE, http://www.netstate.com/states/symb/flags/ks_ 
flag.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). 
 6. The Minnesota State Flag, NETSTATE, http://www.netstate.com/states/symb/flags/ 
mn_flag.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). 
 7. The Oklahoma State Flag, NETSTATE, http://www.netstate.com/states/symb/flags/ 
ok_flag.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013); The Great Seal of Oklahoma, NETSTATE, http:// 
www.netstate.com/states/symb/seals/ok_seal.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). 
 8. The Delaware State Flag, NETSTATE, http://www.netstate.com/states/symb/flags/ 
de_flag.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013); The Great Seal of Delaware, NETSTATE, http:// 
www.netstate.com/states/symb/seals/de_seal.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). 
 9. The Wyoming State Flag, NETSTATE, http://www.netstate.com/states/symb/flags/ 
wy_flag.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).  
 10. The Zia Sun Symbol, N.M. OFFICE OF THE STATE HISTORIAN, http://newmexico 
history.org/multimedia/videos/the-zia-sun-symbol (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). 
 11. New Mexico License Plates, 1969-Present, INDEX OF U.S. LICENSE PLATE PAGES, 
http://www.15q.net/nm.html (last modified Oct. 10, 2011). 
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artist Allan Houser’s sculpture Sacred Rain Arrow.12 Houser, born in 
Oklahoma, was of Chiricahua Apache descent, which frequented the 
subjects of his artwork.13 The inspiration for Sacred Rain Arrow occurred 
in Houser’s youth when an older Chiricahua Apache showed Houser a 
drawing of a young Apache warrior aiming an arrow towards the sky while 
kneeling on the ground.14 The story that inspired the drawing had been told 
for generations, in which the young warrior had been sent to a medicine 
man who blessed his bow and arrows.15 After having his bow and arrows 
blessed, the warrior knelt down and shot his arrow into the heavens, hoping 
to carry the prayer for rain to the Spirit World.16  
One of the few sculptures of Houser’s piece Sacred Rain Arrow has 
resided at the Thomas Gilcrease Museum in Tulsa, Oklahoma, for more 
than two decades.17 The piece is also displayed at the Smithsonian, and was 
even used as the centerpiece of the Olympic Village during the 2002 
Olympic Winter Games.18 In the spring of 2008, Sacred Rain Arrow was 
chosen from five finalists to be displayed on the official Oklahoma license 
plate, which had featured the Osage shield artwork since 1993.19 The other 
finalists Sacred Rain Arrow beat out for the coveted spot included western 
images, such as a portrayal of Will Rogers, and other Native American 
artwork.20 Now roughly 3.2 million vehicles in Oklahoma bear the image 
on their license plates.21 
Although the license plate received an award for Automobile License 
Plate Collectors Association’s best plate of the year in 2009, the new 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Oklahoma License Plates, 1969-Present, INDEX OF U.S. LICENSE PLATE PAGES, 
http://www.15q.net/ok.html (last modified Oct. 3, 2011); Greg Horton, ‘Rain God’ 
Oklahoma License Plate: Pastor Keith Cressman Lawsuit Approved by 10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals, HUFFINGTON POST (Jun. 17, 2013, 3:02 PM EDT), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/06/17/pastor-suit-against-oklahoma-license-plate-ok_n_3455129.html. 
 13. Kelsy Taylor, Sacred Rain Arrow Statue Marks History, GTR NEWSPAPERS, 
http://www.gtrnews.com/greater-tulsa-reporter/4126/sacred-rain-arrow-statue-marks-history 
(last updated Aug. 20, 2009). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Allan Houser (Haozous): Sacred Rain Arrow, COLO. SPRINGS FINE ARTS CENTER, 
http://www.csfineartscenter.org/collection-spotlight/houser-sacred.asp (last visited Sept. 28, 
2013); Taylor, supra note 13. 
 17. Taylor, supra note 13. 
 18. Allan Houser (Haozous): Sacred Rain Arrow, supra note 16; Taylor, supra note 13. 
 19. Taylor, supra note 13. 
 20. New Oklahoma License Plates, SKYSCRAPERCITY, http://www.skyscrapercity.com/ 
showthread.php?t=566007 (last visited Oct. 22, 2013). 
 21. Taylor, supra note 13. 
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Sacred Rain Arrow artwork was not introduced without controversy.22 On 
an article posted to review the new license plate, readers made online 
comments calling the plate “racist” for only representing Native Americans, 
while others were proud of the image, which represents the Native 
American influence in Oklahoman culture.23 One Oklahoman, Keith 
Cressman, was offended by the new license plate design for constitutional 
reasons.  
Cressman filed suit November 2, 2011, against Oklahoma state officials 
alleging that Oklahoma forced Cressman to speak in violation of his First 
Amendment rights by requiring him to display the Sacred Rain Arrow 
image on his license plate.24 The district court dismissed Cressman’s 
complaint, and on June 12, 2013, the Tenth Circuit reinstated his claim.25 
The Tenth Circuit held that Cressman’s complaint put forth a plausible 
compelled speech claim because Cressman alleged adequate facts show that 
the Native American image expresses a particularized message that others 
are likely to understand, and to which Cressman opposes.26 Upon remand to 
the district court, Cressman’s case was unsuccessful on the basis that a 
reasonable observer would not interpret the image to be transmitting a 
religious message.27 
Although other suits have been brought protesting depictions on license 
plates construed as religious,28 Cressman’s case is the first to protest against 
the Native American religious implications of imagery on any official state 
paraphernalia. This case could be the beginning of similar cases filed by 
those offended by the religious attributes of Native American culture on 
state memorabilia. Cressman’s case could have a widespread effect on the 
future possibility of states using tribal artwork in their official state 
memorabilia, because so many states use imagery similar to Sacred Rain 
Arrow.  
This Comment examines the possibility of lawsuits closely resembling 
Cressman’s, the legal claims likely to support the suits, and how the courts 
should analyze these types of cases. Part II explains the two legal actions 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1158 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 23. New Oklahoma License Plate, ABOUT.COM, http://okc.about.com/b/2008/08/19/new-
oklahoma-license-plate.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). 
 24. Cressman, 719 F.3d 1139. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Cressman v. Thompson, No. CIV-11-1290-HE, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 
2014). 
 28. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
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that affronted citizens will most likely pursue, the Establishment Clause and 
compelled speech doctrine. Part III analyzes the likely outcome of these 
cases, and Part IV offers a balancing approach for courts to use in order to 
successfully weigh the First Amendment rights of citizens against the 
interests of the states in preserving their rich Native American culture. 
II. History of the Establishment Clause and Compelled Speech Doctrine 
The text of the First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”29 Out of this text have risen two constitutional 
limitations on the government: the Establishment Clause and the compelled 
speech doctrine, which are the two doctrines most likely to be used by 
citizens wanting to assert claims against their respective states for being 
forced to display Native American depictions in violation of their religious 
beliefs on various state memorabilia.  
A. Development of the Establishment Clause Jurisprudence 
Before incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Establishment 
Clause was rarely litigated in the Supreme Court.30 The Supreme Court 
itself has referred to the First Amendment religion text as “opaque.”31 
Years after incorporation, the Court used a straightforward, two-prong test 
that asked first whether the action by the government had a religious 
purpose, and second if the action had a religious effect.32 The Supreme 
Court developed the three-part Lemon test in 1971.33 
                                                                                                                 
 29. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 30. Frank J. Ducoat, Inconsistent Guideposts: Van Orden, McCreary County, and the 
Continuing Need for a Single and Predictable Establishment Clause Test, RUTGERS J.L. & 
RELIGION, 3 (Spring 2007), http://lawandreligion.com/sites/lawandreligion.com/files/Ducoat. 
pdf (volume 8, part 2). 
 31. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. The Supreme Court uses three different approaches to Establishment Clause 
cases: strict separation, neutrality, or accommodation & equality. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1236-37, 1240 (4th ed. 2011). The strict separation approach is 
described by Thomas Jefferson’s metaphor of a wall separating church and state. Id. at 1236. 
This is unattainable, because it would result in an impossible standard, which would not 
allow the government to provide routine services such as police or fire assistance to the 
church. Id. at 1237. The neutrality approach mandates the government to be neutral to 
religion, and not favor one religion over another or secularism over religion. Id.  The 
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In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the subjects of constitutional debate were a 
Rhode Island state statute that provided a salary supplement for nonpublic 
schoolteachers, and a Pennsylvania state statute that provided 
reimbursement for salaries, textbooks, and other materials for certain 
secular subjects in nonpublic schools.34 The Court stated that the 
Establishment Clause was meant to give protection from three main evils: 
“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in 
religious activity.”35 In order to fulfill its duty to protect the public from 
these evils, the Court’s test asked first, if the state has a “secular legislative 
purpose”; second, if its “principal or primary effect [n]either advances nor 
inhibits religion”; and last, whether the statute fosters “an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.”36 
The Court held the Rhode Island statute failed the Lemon test because by 
providing the salary supplements to nonpublic teachers, the government 
entangled itself with religion; the Court came to this conclusion by 
reasoning that a dedicated religious teacher would have difficulty 
maintaining religious neutrality.37 The lines between the secular and 
religious classes were very blurred, and even with the best of intentions a 
teacher would find it difficult to maintain a complete separation between 
secular teaching and religious doctrine.38 The Pennsylvania statute failed 
the Lemon test because the government had to monitor the courses given 
compensation and establish the cost between secular and religious 
educations, which entangled the state with religion.39 The statute also 
allowed state financial aid to go directly to religious schools, which caused 
further entanglement.40  
Although Lemon has perhaps been considered the principal 
Establishment Clause test, three years after the case was decided the 
Supreme Court held that the factors in Lemon were “no more than helpful 
                                                                                                                 
“symbolic endorsement” test developed in Van Orden v. Perry measures the neutrality of the 
government. Id. at 1237, 1240. Finally, the accommodation or equality approach 
acknowledges the importance of religion in society, and would have religion accommodated 
in the government. Id. at 1240. The only way the establishment clause would be violated 
under this approach would be if the government established a church, required religious 
participation, or favored one religion over another. Id. at 1242.  
 34. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607, 609.      
 35. Id. at 612. 
 36. Id. at 612-13. 
 37. Id. at 602, 618. 
 38. Id. at 618-19. 
 39. Id. at 621. 
 40. Id. 
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signposts.”41 In Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice O’Connor proposed the 
"endorsement test" in her concurrence, which incorporates the same prongs 
from the Lemon test but interprets them in a different light.42 The 
endorsement test essentially combines the Lemon purpose and effect prong 
to inquire into whether the government’s purpose is to endorse or 
disapprove of religion, and whether the effect, notwithstanding purpose, is 
to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval as understood by the 
reasonable observer.43 Justice O’Connor explained endorsement as 
“send[ing] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to 
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community . . . [d]isapproval sends the opposite message.”44 Justice 
O’Connor also emphasized, “it is only practices having that effect [of 
government endorsement or disapproval of religion], whether intentionally 
or unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or public 
perception, to status in the political community.”45 
The Court applied the endorsement test in County of Allegheny v. ACLU 
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, in which the subjects of debate were the 
display of a crèche in the county courthouse and an eighteen foot Chanukah 
menorah placed next to a forty-five foot Christmas tree by the entrance to 
the City-County Building in Pittsburgh; a sign was displayed in front of the 
tree and menorah stating “Salute to Liberty.”46 The Court stated that 
endorsement is not self-defining, but “derives its meaning from other words 
that this Court has found useful over the years in interpreting the 
Establishment Clause.”47 The Supreme Court held that because the crèche 
was displayed singularly in a prominent area of the building with nothing to 
detract from its religious message, it would be seen as an “unmistakable 
message that [the city] supports and promotes the Christian praise to God 
that is the creche’s religious message.”48  
The Court acknowledged that the menorah was a closer constitutional 
question, but stated the menorah had a religious and secular meaning, and 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973). 
 42. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). 
 43. Id. at 690; Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 
620 (1989). 
 44. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688. 
 45. Id. at 692. 
 46. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578, 581-82, 587. 
 47. Id. at 593. 
 48. Id. at 600. 
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when considering the setting the effect was an “overall holiday setting.”49 
However, the Court recognized endorsing two religions has the same 
constitutional effect as endorsing one, and questioned whether the 
integrated display of the tree, menorah, and the sign had the effect of 
endorsing the Christian and Jewish faiths, or whether it would simply be 
seen as a secular celebration of the holiday season.50 The Supreme Court 
held that because the Christmas tree was not a religious symbol, and 
because the city did not have an emblem with lesser religious implications 
to represent the Chanukah holiday (whose religious effect was further 
diluted by the sign) the display did not fail the endorsement test.51 
The two most recent Establishment Clause cases both decided by the 
Supreme Court on June 27, 2005, albeit very differently, are Van Orden v. 
Perry and McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of 
Kentucky. Each case considered whether displays of the Ten 
Commandments on government property violated the Establishment 
Clause.52 The Supreme Court is likely to apply these cases to those 
concerning Native American symbolism in official state memorabilia 
because of the similarities. Native American artwork and images displayed 
on state items often have religious meanings or associations like the Ten 
Commandments displayed on government property have religious 
meanings or associations.  
In Van Orden v. Perry, a plurality opinion, a monument inscribed with 
the Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds, which had 
been in place for more than forty years, fell within the limitations of the 
Establishment Clause.53 Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas in finding that to apply the Lemon test would 
be illogical, and its analysis was “driven both by the nature of the 
monument and by our Nation’s history.”54 The four justices also stated that 
in applying the Establishment Clause its cases point in two directions: one 
face looks toward the powerful role played by religion and religious 
traditions throughout the history of the Nation, and the other face considers 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 613-14. 
 50. Id. at 616. 
 51. Id. at 616-18. 
 52. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 
U.S. 677 (2005). 
 53. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 677, 679.   
 54. Id. at 686. 
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the fundamental assumption that governmental intervention in religious 
matters can cause a danger to religious freedom.55 
In their analysis of Van Orden, the justices acknowledged that although 
the Court has sometimes used Lemon as the governing test in Establishment 
Clause cases, not all the justices agree on the test, and in some cases the 
Court has simply not applied Lemon at all, or applied the Lemon test after 
deciding a challenged practice was unconstitutional under a different 
Establishment Clause test.56 The decision not to impose the Lemon test in 
Van Orden was made because of the monument’s passive nature, and the 
justices instead reflected on the role of religion in the United States’ 
history, starting with George Washington’s issuance of a Thanksgiving Day 
Proclamation to be devoted to prayer and thankfulness to God.57 The 
justices seemed to indicate that the Lemon test is inappropriate in cases 
concerning longstanding practices within the government that may have 
religious origins or implications; this is evidenced by their discussion of 
how opening legislative sessions with prayer and religious images in the 
Supreme Court and around the nation’s capital is constitutional.58  
Chief Justice Rehnquist and those in concurrence with him clarified that 
there are limitations to the displays of religious messages or symbols by the 
government, citing the case Stone v. Graham.59 In Stone, the Supreme 
Court held displaying the Ten Commandments in every public classroom 
was unconstitutional, but the justices in Van Orden differentiated the 
classroom displays from the Texas monument by explaining that the 
monument was a much more passive use of the Ten Commandments.60 The 
four justices noted that the petitioner walked by the Texas monument for 
years before bringing suit, and that the monument represented both Texas 
political and legal history.61 The monument served a dual purpose of 
representing both religion and government, and because having religious 
content does not singularly run afoul of the Establishment Clause, the 
justices found the monument to be constitutional.62 
Conversely, in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued to enjoin displays featuring gold-
                                                                                                                 
 55. Id. at 683. 
 56. Id. at 685-86. 
 57. Id. at 686-87. 
 58. Id. at 687-88. 
 59. Id. at 678. 
 60. Id. at 690-91. 
 61. Id. at 691. 
 62. Id. at 691-92. 
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framed, large copies of the Ten Commandments in two courthouses in 
different Kentucky counties.63 The displays were modified to add eight 
smaller, historical documents with religious references as the single shared 
element, such as the “endowed by their Creator” passage of the Declaration 
of Independence.64 The district court issued a preliminary injunction against 
the original displays, and the counties revised the displays for the third 
time.65 The third display, named “The Foundations of American Law and 
Government Display,” was comprised of nine framed, equally sized 
documents including the Commandments, Star Spangled Banner lyrics, and 
the Declaration of Independence.66 On motion from the ACLU, the district 
court included the third display in the injunction.67 The Sixth Circuit 
affirmed, and the Supreme Court upheld the Sixth Circuit’s ruling.68  
Although the two counties asked the Court to disregard the purpose in 
displaying the pictures, because the “official purpose is unknowable” and 
any search for it would be in vain, the Supreme Court held that the purpose 
of the counties in displaying the Ten Commandments in courtrooms may be 
considered, and that the “development of the presentation should be 
considered when determining its purpose.”69 The Court held the second 
display had an impermissible purpose because of the religious focus, and 
that the third display also had an impermissible purpose because the 
revision was simply for a “litigating position.”70 The Court also explained 
its decision by noting that when analyzing the third display “[n]o 
reasonable observer could swallow the claim that the [c]ounties had cast off 
the [religious] objective so unmistakable in the earlier displays.”71 
The Court reaffirmed the “touchstone for [its] analysis is the principle 
that the ‘First Amendment mandates government neutrality between 
religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion,’” and the value 
of the Lemon test.72 The Court maintained that looking at purpose is 
important to prevent the government from forgoing neutrality and acting 
with the intention to favor a religious point of view, and emphasized that 
                                                                                                                 
 63. 545 U.S. 844, 851-52 (2005). 
 64. Id. at 844. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 845. 
 69. Id. at 850-51. 
 70. Id. at 870-72.  
 71. Id. at 872. 
 72. Id. at 860-61. 
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examining purpose makes practical sense.73 The Court also stated there was 
no indication that when looking at purpose the test would be fatal every 
time in claims involving violations of the Establishment Clause.74 In fact, 
the Court noted the test was not fatal very often, because the government 
did not usually act with the “predominant purpose of advancing religion.”75 
The two counties in McCreary also argued the purpose in this case 
should only be inferred “from the latest news about the last in a series of 
governmental actions,” disregarding how close they may be in subject and 
time.76 The Court rejected this notion, and stated that “the world is not 
made brand new every morning,” and that the counties wanted an 
“absentminded objective observer,” not one who is accustomed with past 
government actions and proficient in assessing what context the policy 
arises from.77 The Supreme Court held that purpose must be weighed 
heavily under the Establishment Clause and considered in the light of 
context.78 The Court restated the importance of neutrality, but also made it 
clear that the Court’s holding did not mean sacred text could never be used 
in a governmental display without violating the Establishment Clause.79  
The two very different avenues the Court took in deciding its most recent 
Establishment Clause cases are a clear portrayal of the confusion and lack 
of clarity in this area of the law, as well as evidence of the differing 
opinions among the justices in the application of the Lemon test. The 
Supreme Court has made no clear test for Establishment Clause purposes 
and until it does decide to adopt a majority test, the lower courts will 
continue to wade through the murky waters of this doctrine. 
B. Creation of the Compelled Speech Doctrine 
The Supreme Court introduced the compelled speech doctrine in 1943 
when the Court held in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 
that the government could not force a student to recite the Pledge of 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Id. at 860-62. The Court also noted that appellate courts across the country examine 
purpose daily, and that “eyes that look to purposes belong to an ‘objective observer,’ one 
who takes account of the traditional external signs that show up in the ‘text, legislative 
history, and implementation of the statute,’ or comparable official act.” Id. at 862. 
 74. Id. at 863. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 866. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 874. 
 79. Id. 
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Allegiance.80 The school policy at issue in Barnette stated that if a student 
did not comply and recite the pledge they would be expelled from the 
school, and the student’s parents or guardians would be liable to 
prosecution and possibly fined up to fifty dollars or jailed for thirty days.81 
In Barnette, the Court held that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their therein,” and 
declared the school’s practice to be unconstitutional.82 
The Court expanded its reasoning in Barnette in the 1977 case Wooley v. 
Maynard, which, like Cressman, involved speech on a license plate.83 In 
Wooley, an action was brought for injunctive and declaratory relief against 
the New Hampshire statutes criminalizing the obstruction of the words 
“Live Free or Die” on its state license plates.84 This gave the Court an 
opportunity to further develop the compelled speech doctrine. 
Maynard and his wife were members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses faith, 
and considered the motto “Live Free or Die” as contrary to their political, 
moral, and religious beliefs, which caused the couple to cover up the saying 
on their jointly owned family vehicles.85 Maynard was issued a citation and 
given a twenty-five-dollar fine for committing a felony by covering up the 
motto.86 One month later, Maynard was charged with the same violation 
and fined fifty dollars, and spent fifteen days in jail.87 Before trial for his 
second violation, Maynard received a third violation of the same offense 
and was convicted as “continued for sentence” and received no additional 
punishment to the fifteen days he spent in jail.88 
The District Court held that Maynard was engaging in symbolic speech 
by covering up the state motto on his license plate, and that the interest of 
New Hampshire in enforcing its defacement statute was not great enough to 
justify restricting Maynard’s constitutionally protected expression.89 The 
Supreme Court decided not to examine the symbolic speech issue, but 
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instead considered the objection of the Maynards to displaying “Live Free 
or Die” on their license plates.90 
The Court began its analysis by reaffirming its decision in Barnette, and 
observed that the New Hampshire statute required the appellees to “use 
their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological 
message.”91 It was unpersuasive to the Court that most citizens would agree 
with New Hampshire’s motto; the First Amendment’s protection extends to 
the right of citizens to have a different ideology than the majority of the 
population, and the “state [cannot] constitutionally require an individual to 
participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it 
on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be 
observed and read by the public.”92  
The Court looked at New Hampshire’s countervailing interest to see if its 
interest was sufficiently compelling to warrant the requirement for the 
appellees to display the motto on their license plates.93 The interests of the 
state were to “(1) facilitat[e] the identification of passenger vehicles, and 
(2) promot[e] appreciation of history, individualism, and state pride.”94 The 
Court held that the purpose of identification could be achieved by more 
narrow means.95 When considering the second interest of the state, the 
Supreme Court held that although the state may circulate state pride, 
individualism, and respect for history, this interest could not outweigh an 
individual’s First Amendment right to avoid portraying this message, and 
affirmed the judgment of the district court.96  
The Supreme Court continued to develop the compelled speech doctrine 
in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 
(GLIB).97 In Hurley, gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of Irish 
immigrants formed the respondent organization GLIB in order to march in 
Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day parade, and were denied by the organization that 
orchestrated the parade, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council (the 
Council).98 The Council was comprised of individuals from different South 
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Boston veterans groups.99 The GLIB obtained a court order to be able to 
march in the parade, but was refused again the following year, and the 
organization filed suit against the Council.100 The state trial court rejected 
the Council’s contention that the parade was private, and found that the 
Council’s refusal was in violation of the state’s public accommodations 
law, and in contrast with purpose of St. Patrick’s Day, which is to celebrate 
diversity.101  
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts affirmed, and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.102 The Court noted while the Council presented a First 
Amendment claim, the respondents did not, but the activity disputed was 
within the nature of protected speech, and that it would decide 
accordingly.103 The Court discussed the form of speech parades fall under, 
and held that parades are a form of expression by the “inherent 
expressiveness of marching to make a point.”104 The Court also held that 
the protected expression in a parade is not limited to its songs and banners 
because the Constitution “looks beyond written or spoken words as 
mediums of expression.”105 The Supreme Court held that a “speaker has the 
autonomy to choose the content of his own message,” and reversed the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court decision, finding the public accommodation 
law application to the parade unconstitutional.106 
III. Effects of the Establishment Clause and Compelled Speech Doctrine on 
State Sponsored Native American Imagery 
When Keith Cressman brought his claim against various Oklahoma 
public officials for being compelled to display the Sacred Rain Arrow 
artwork on his vehicles’ license plates, he posed a unique issue to the court, 
which had not yet been considered. Cressman’s case was ultimately decided 
against him upon remand to the district court, which may discourage others 
from bringing similar claims. However, close examination of his case, 
including analysis of the lower court’s decision and how the Tenth Circuit 
reached its decision to reinstate the case, could lead to success of future 
claims.  
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A. Cressman v. Thompson 
Keith Cressman, a Methodist minister at St. Mark’s United Methodist 
Church in Bethany, Oklahoma, believes there is “one true God,” and that it 
is a sin to concede any other god.107 In August of 2008, Cressman learned 
that the Oklahoma standard vehicle license plate had been given a new 
design, and the new plate would be introduced in January of 2009.108 Upon 
seeing Houser’s artwork displayed on the license plate, Cressman 
“discerned that [it] depicted and communicated Native American religious 
beliefs in contradiction to his own Christian religious beliefs.”109 Cressman 
researched the piece of art, and learned of the inspiration behind the 
sculpture.110  
From Cressman’s perspective, the piece “retells the story of a Native 
American who believes in sacred objects[,] in multiple deities and in the 
divinity of nature[,] and in the ability of humans to use sacred objects to 
convince gods to alter nature.”111 Cressman does not wish to display the 
image on his vehicle’s license plate because he believes its message will 
communicate ideas about Native American culture and practices which 
contradict his sincerely-held religious beliefs; Cressman would rather 
remain silent in consideration to images and messages he cannot endorse or 
accept.112 Cressman stated, “The underlying narrative of this story, and of 
the license plate where the story is depicted, communicates the promotion 
of pantheism, panentheism, polytheism, and/or animism and promotes those 
particular Native Americans’ social and cultural practices that accept these 
religious ideas.”113 
Initially, Cressman avoided the license plate featuring Sacred Rain 
Arrow by purchasing a specialty license plate, which cost an additional 
thirty-seven dollars, and had a thirty-five dollar renewal fee.114 In an effort 
to reduce his cost, Cressman purchased a cheaper license plate, which was 
eighteen dollars more than the standard plate with a sixteen dollar and fifty 
cent renewal fee.115 After deciding he did not want to pay extra fees for a 
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specialty license plate, Cressman looked into whether he could simply 
cover up the picture of the artwork on his plate.116 After visiting the Motor 
Vehicle Division of the Oklahoma Tax Commission in Oklahoma City and 
an officer with the Department of Public Safety, Cressman discovered that 
covering up the image would violate title 47, section 1113 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes, which provides: “The license plate, decal, and all letters and 
numbers shall be clearly visible at all times.”117 A violation of this section 
is a misdemeanor, punishable with a fine of up to $300.118  
1. Dismissal by the Lower Court 
Cressman continued to pay additional fees for specialty license plates on 
two vehicles, and in March 2010, he sent letters to several different officials 
in various departments, requesting a remedy for his situation.119 Cressman 
received no responses for these letters, and subsequently filed a 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 civil rights lawsuit against various public officials in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, alleging the violation 
of his rights with consideration to the freedom of speech, due process, and 
the free exercise of religion under the First and Fourteenth amendments.120 
Cressman filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the 
defendants from administering section 1113, and alternatively requested the 
court to compel the defendants to provide specialty license plates to 
Cressman at no further cost.121 
In order to determine whether Cressman’s request for a preliminary 
injunction would be granted, the district court first considered whether 
Cressman was substantially likely to succeed on the merits.122 The court 
held that while it did not doubt the genuineness of Cressman’s religious 
beliefs, he did not meet his burden of showing he had been compelled to 
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engage in speech and to “be an instrument for fostering public adherence to 
an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.”123  
The court distinguished Cressman’s case from Wooley by finding that the 
speech involved in Cressman’s was symbolic instead of a written or verbal 
expression.124 The court stated that for symbols or conduct to fall within the 
realms of the First and Fourteenth amendments, they must be “sufficiently 
imbued with elements of communication,” by showing that Oklahoma’s 
“intent [through its use of the Native American image] [was] to convey a 
‘particularized message’ along with a great likelihood that the message will 
be understood by those viewing it.”125  
The court supported its finding that the image did not convey a 
particularized message by examining the circumstances in which Cressman 
discovered the meaning of the image.126 The court held “nothing on the tag 
indicates that the image is based on a sculptur[e],” and that “while 
[Cressman] clearly links the image to the sculpture and legend, nothing on 
the license plate, itself, makes or suggests that connection.”127 The court 
acknowledged Cressman’s independent research was the basis for his 
knowledge of the image’s meaning, and held that even if a reasonable 
observer knew of the image’s origin, the court would still not find the 
observer likely to associate the driver of a car featuring this license plate 
with the image’s religious affiliations.128  
The court also found that even if Cressman had shown other people 
might interpret the license plate to be communicating a message concerning 
Cressman’s religious beliefs, the court would still conclude that Cressman 
had not been coerced to speak in violation of his constitutional rights 
because a reasonable observer could not garner a religious meaning from 
the image or impute such meaning to the driver.129 The court followed the 
Supreme Court’s caution that it “cannot accept that an apparently limitless 
variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in 
the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”130 Because the objective 
observer viewing the symbol would not likely understand a particularized 
message from the symbol, the court held that the State of Oklahoma was 
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not attempting to promote an ideological point of view to the public, unlike 
the speech in Wooley, and dismissed Cressman’s complaint.131 
2. Reversed by the Tenth Circuit 
Cressman appealed the lower court’s decision, and the Tenth Circuit 
considered whether the district court erred in dismissing Cressman’s 
complaint for failure to state a First Amendment compelled speech claim.132 
The Tenth Circuit (1) addressed the Supreme Court’s precedence of 
symbolic speech and compelled speech claims under the First Amendment, 
(2) analyzed Cressman’s complaint to assess whether it stated a plausible 
compelled symbolic speech claim, and (3) addressed the defendants’ 
argument that the image was government speech that does not involve the 
First Amendment.133 
After reviewing Wooley, Hurley, and several other Supreme Court 
decisions concerning compelled speech claims, the court agreed that 
Cressman was compelled to exhibit the image on his license plate “because 
he must choose between (1) prosecution and criminal penalties for covering 
up the image and (2) paying additional fees for specialty license plates that 
do not display the image.”134 The court also recognized that Cressman’s 
claim was different than the claim in Wooley because it was based on an 
image instead of written words, and considered whether the image was 
symbolic speech that requires First Amendment safeguarding; after 
answering affirmatively, the court considered whether Cressman’s 
requirement to display the image violated his First Amendment rights under 
the compelled speech doctrine.135 
The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has “long recognized 
that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word.”136 The 
Supreme Court has protected expressive conduct such as wearing an 
armband to express particular views and the burning of an American flag to 
make a political demonstration.137 The Tenth Circuit noted the origin of the 
Supreme Court’s “particularized message” language was in Spence v. 
Washington, and concerned a flag hung upside down with peace symbols 
attached to both sides, which was found to be conveying a particular 
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message.138 This language reappeared in Texas v. Johnson, a flag burning 
case, which was also held to communicate a particular message likely to be 
understood.139 
Spence and Johnson both asked whether symbolic speech was permeated 
with elements of communication by considering whether there was “(1) an 
intent to convey a particularized message, and (2) a great likelihood that the 
message would be understood by those who viewed the symbolic act or 
display.”140 In Hurley, the Court suggested these factors are not required 
prerequisites for symbolic speech; the Supreme Court stated, “a narrow, 
succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional 
protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized 
message,’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of 
Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of 
Lewis Carroll.”141 The Tenth Circuit did not deliberate over the effect of 
Hurley on the Spence-Johnson factors, but simply recognized that these 
factors may be a too high of a standard at times for First Amendment 
protection.142 
After reviewing the Supreme Court’s discussion of compelled and 
symbolic speech, the Tenth Circuit analyzed whether Cressman pled a 
plausible First Amendment compelled speech claim arising from symbolic 
speech.143 The court held that Cressman’s complaint met the more stringent 
Spence-Johnson factors when accepting all the factual allegations in 
Cressman’s complaint as true, which stated that observers would 
understand that the plate conveys messages about Native American culture, 
including their religious beliefs.144 Cressman sufficiently showed that the 
license plate image was symbolic speech, and the district court erred in 
rejecting Cressman’s allegations as true.145 The Tenth Circuit next 
considered whether Cressman plausibly stated a claim for compelled speech 
protection.146 Because Cressman alleged the image was ideological speech, 
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based on Native American religious beliefs, the Tenth Circuit ruled that his 
claim should survive.147 
The Tenth Circuit also briefly considered the appellees’ argument that 
the image was government speech which does not implement First 
Amendment scrutiny, and that the Supreme Court had implicitly limited 
Wooley.148 The court cautioned against suggestions that the Supreme Court 
had overruled or narrowed its cases, and noted that the Court had the 
opportunity to do just that in later cases, but refused to do so.149 The Tenth 
Circuit held that the “relevant question is whether Mr. Cressman is ‘closely 
linked with the expression in a way that makes [him] appear to endorse the 
government message,” and that Wooley answered this question by finding 
that license plates act as mobile billboards which adequately connect the 
driver of the vehicle to the speech, which in turn raises compelled speech 
issues.150 The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court’s dismissal of 
Cressman’s claim and denial for this motion to grant a preliminary 
injunction, and remanded the case back to the district court.151 
Judge Paul Kelly Jr., dissented from the majority opinion, based on his 
belief that the complaint did not contain adequate factual allegations to 
show beyond speculation that Cressman was entitled to relief.152 Judge 
Kelly discussed the context of the image, which in Oklahoma he argued 
would be seen as a historical or cultural message because of the state’s 
integral Native American culture.153 According to Judge Kelly, Cressman’s 
allegations that the image was an ideological message were simply 
unreasonable inferences, and therefore the district court’s ruling of the 
complaint’s dismissal should have be affirmed.154  
3. Denied Relief Once Again by the District Court  
Upon remand, the district court considered whether the image conveyed 
a particularized message or whether it at least gave the appearance of some 
type of religious implication or theme, and found that it did not.155 The 
court’s reasoning relied heavily on Cressman having to independently 
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research the image to learn of its origin and associate the art with religion; 
the court found this evidenced the conclusion that the ordinary person 
would not facially recognize the image as having a religious message.156 
The court also justified its decision by noting that the image was not an 
exact replica of Sacred Rain Arrow because the warrior in the image on the 
license plate held his arrow at approximately a sixty-degree angle in 
comparison to the almost vertical arrow in the original image.157 The court 
found that this slight change could deter viewers from assuming Oklahoma 
was intending to emit the same message as the sculptor originally 
intended.158 
The district court emphasized “the essential question is what a 
reasonable observer of the image on the license plate would understand 
from it.”159 The court acknowledged that Hurley indicated the Spence-
Johnson test could be too stringent in some instances, and in order to assess 
what message a reasonable observer would understand from the image, the 
court must look not at “whether there is a ‘great likelihood’ that a particular 
message would be understood, but simply whether it is reasonably likely 
that it would.”160 In applying this standard, this district court held that a 
reasonable observer would not likely understand a message being conveyed 
by the image because “without further research it is simply a depiction of 
an Indian shooting a bow and arrow.”161 To support this contention, the 
court referenced Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 
Inc.162 
B. Compelled Speech Claims Brought by Affronted Citizens Protesting the 
Display of Native American Artwork Could Likely Be Successful 
Cressman was ultimately unsuccessful with his compelled speech claim, 
but other similar cases could very likely be successful if the basis of the 
claim has a more overtly religious message. The district court was reluctant 
to readily accept the replica of Sacred Rain Arrow on the Oklahoma license 
plate as expressing a clear religious message, but this will not deter 
plaintiffs bringing other cases based on artwork that facially has religious 
attributions. In the interest of balancing the state’s Native American culture 
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and Cressman's First Amendment rights the court reached the correct 
decision, but its analysis in getting there did not coincide with Supreme 
Court precedent. 
The district court did remedy an oversight made by the Tenth Circuit. 
Although the Tenth Circuit discussed the “particularized message” and 
“likelihood the message would be understood” factors for symbolic speech 
from Spence and Johnson, and the suggestion from Hurley that at times 
these factors are too high of a bar, it did not consider a recent Supreme 
Court case which addressed this issue and could be highly probative to the 
issue of Native American artwork being viewed as speech.163 The district 
court in Cressman briefly referenced the case, but instead of undermining 
Cressman’s argument like the court intended it to, this case could positively 
impact other compelled speech cases concerning Native American imagery. 
In 2006, the Supreme Court decided Rumsfeld, which considered 
whether the Solomon Amendment, which at the time precluded the 
Department of Defense from issuing federal funds to any institution of 
higher education that effectively prevented military recruiters from entering 
their campuses, violated law schools’ First Amendment rights of speech 
and association.164 The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 
(FAIR) is an association of law schools and faculties who promote full 
academic freedom and oppose discrimination, including discrimination to 
others based on sexual orientation.165 In furtherance of this policy, FAIR 
members wanted to restrict military recruiting on their campuses because of 
the policy adopted by Congress regarding homosexuals in the military; 
however, because their funding would be withheld, the schools were forced 
to choose between their nondiscrimination position and receiving federal 
funding.166 
FAIR sought a preliminary injunction against the Solomon Amendment, 
and was denied by the district court, who found that forcing upon the 
schools “an unwanted periodic visitor” did not “significantly affect the law 
schools’ ability to express their particular message or viewpoint.”167 The 
Third Circuit held the Solomon Amendment infringed upon the schools’ 
constitutional rights based on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
because the schools were torn between receiving federal funding and 
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asserting their First Amendment rights.168 The case was reversed and 
remanded for the lower court to enter a preliminary injunction against 
enforcing the Solomon Amendment, and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.169 
The Supreme Court discussed the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
and held that the Solomon Amendment would violate this doctrine if 
Congress could not otherwise require these schools to give equal access to 
their students to military recruiters when compared to other employers.170 
The Court noted that the Solomon Amendment regulated the conduct of the 
schools, not their speech, but then considered the reasoning by the Third 
Circuit that (1) in supplying the military recruiters’ services the law schools 
were being compelled to speak, (2) military recruiters were speaking while 
on campus, and (3) if the statute regulated conduct, the conduct was 
expressive and regulating would infringe on the law schools’ First 
Amendment rights.171 
The Court rejected the Third Circuit’s ruling that the Solomon 
Amendment impermissibly controlled speech, but then considered whether 
the expressiveness of the conduct controlled by the statute fell within the 
protection of the First Amendment.172 In analyzing this issue, the Court 
referred to Johnson but instead of using the “particularized message” 
language the Court stated, “we have extended First Amendment protection 
only to conduct that is inherently expressive.”173 The Court looked at the 
conduct the law schools claimed expressed disagreement with the military 
(military recruiters interviewing away from the law schools) and reasoned 
that this conduct could be explained for a variety of reasons, such as, there 
was no space to interview at the law schools, or that independently the 
recruiters decided to interview somewhere else.174 The Court held that the 
“expressive component of a law school’s actions is not created by the 
conduct itself but by the speech that accompanies it,” and reversed the 
Third Circuit’s decision.175 
This decision did not expressly render the factors in Spence and Johnson 
invalid, but rather expanded them. The district court analogized this case to 
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Cressman, and found that because the message Cressman opposed required 
research, it too fell short of First Amendment protection. This is an 
erroneous application of Rumsfeld because of the extreme factual 
differences in the cases and because it does not take into consideration 
former Supreme Court case Hurley that easily answers this question. In 
Rumsfeld, the conduct being questioned was the absence of military 
recruiters at a law school, compared to the artwork in Cressman’s case. The 
issue in Rumsfeld was whether a message was being communicated at all, 
while in Cressman’s case there was clearly a message, though perhaps 
interpreted varyingly by different viewers.  
The Supreme Court in Hurley explicitly stated the requirement of a 
particularized message to be too high of a bar in some instances because it 
would not protect the “painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold 
Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”176 This seems to 
indicate that the Supreme Court views artwork as inherently expressive.177 
Plaintiffs in future cases opposing Native American artwork could use 
Rumsfeld and Hurley to show that art is expressive and that in considering 
all of these factors, the artwork should clearly be seen as speech, and 
implicate First Amendment concerns. 
In its compelled speech precedent, the Supreme Court has not addressed 
the issue of whose viewpoint courts should use when assessing speech that 
does not have an explicit message like “Live Free or Die” as in Wooley. 
The district court adopted a reasonable observer standard, which seems to 
coincide with previous Supreme Court rulings, including Rumsfeld. The 
language used in Rumsfeld is “inherently expressive,” and for something to 
be considered inherent it must “belon[g] to the basic nature of someone or 
something.”178 To know the “basic nature” of something, it is logical to 
look at how the ordinary person would categorize an object, so this seems 
consistent with using a reasonable observer standard in interpreting the 
artwork’s message or lack thereof. This standard does not conflict with 
former Supreme Court cases, and can be a workable measure in conjunction 
with “inherently expressive” when dealing with abstract content such as 
artwork. The Spence-Johnson factors in Cressman’s case were ultimately 
unsuccessful because of the ambiguity surrounding the artwork and its 
disputed message. Because “Live Free or Die” was actually written out on 
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the license plate in Wooley, it was easy to establish that the plate was 
conveying an ideological message, and although the message could be 
interpreted as historical or cultural based on the origin of New Hampshire, 
overall the statement would be seen as promoting an ideology. The 
Oklahoma license plate is much more difficult to analyze because it does 
not explicitly state an ideological message. As the lower court correctly 
found, the first impression of the image is simply a warrior shooting an 
arrow; it does not immediately raise questions about its religious origins.  
Even though the district court did not find a violation of Cressman’s First 
Amendment rights, this case will draw the attention of potential plaintiffs 
objecting to states’ use of Native American imagery, and by looking at the 
lower court’s decision, will enable future plaintiffs to present much stronger 
cases. Although the religious message in Cressman was not explicit enough 
to create a compelled speech violation, other uses of Native American 
imagery could be interpreted by the courts as having a strong enough 
religious message to prompt First Amendment protection. 
C. Establishment Clause Claims Brought for States’ Use of Native 
American Artwork Will Likely Be Unsuccessful 
Although not brought as an avenue for recovery by Cressman, within 
appellees’ brief to the Tenth Circuit lies discussion of why an 
Establishment Clause claim made by Cressman would be unsuccessful. Any 
state involvement with religion brings with it Establishment Clause 
concerns, and with the religious aspects of Native American artwork and 
the frequency that such artwork is used, this is likely another area of the law 
which could see a rise in cases brought protesting Native American 
imagery. 
Appellees described Cressman’s argument that an image need not be 
particularized or ideological for First Amendment compelled speech 
protection as unusual, and a facade for hiding Cressman’s real objection to 
the artwork, which according to appellees is based on a violation of the 
Establishment Clause.179 Appellees contended that an Establishment Clause 
claim based on the Sacred Rain Arrow image would be unsuccessful, 
relying heavily on the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Weinbaum v. City of Las 
Cruses.180 
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In Weinbaum, the Tenth Circuit considered whether the display of three 
crosses on the city of Las Cruces’ official seal placed on various public 
properties violated the Establishment Clause.181 The court held that when 
considering whether artwork violates the Establishment Clause, “the artist’s 
inspiration or intent is irrelevant,” and when applying the Lemon test, the 
crosses did not cause a violation because the name Las Cruces literally 
means crosses.182 The appellees argue that the same reasoning could be 
used in Cressman’s case.183 
Appellees contend that under Establishment Clause analysis, a court will 
look at the government’s intent in speaking, and under Free Exercise and 
Free Speech analysis, a court would look at the person’s intent in wanting 
to speak, which is why Cressman chose to only bring a compelled speech 
claim.184 In Cressman’s case, the Legislative Task Force chose Sacred Rain 
Arrow for tourism reasons and to publicize Oklahoma as “Native-America,” 
which is vastly different than Cressman’s subjective belief of the religious 
implications of the image.185  
Appellees are correct in asserting that a court will look at the purpose of 
the government in Establishment Clause cases, but are erroneous in 
assuming that simply because the government did not have the intent to 
promote religion in Cressman’s case it avoided violating the Establishment 
Clause; this type of analysis is vastly contradictory to the endorsement test. 
In McCreary County, the Supreme Court discussed the role of intent in 
these types of cases, and acknowledged that purpose was important but 
should not be the sole focus of the parties involved because the government 
rarely acts with the express purpose of promoting religion. If there is 
evidence of the government acting with an illegitimate purpose, a court’s 
analysis could end there, such as in McCreary. However, in cases where 
there is not a showing of the government acting with a forbidden motive, a 
court’s analysis will go beyond the government’s purpose when deciding 
whether there has been a violation of the Establishment Clause and look at 
the effect of the government’s action.  
In Cressman’s case, the government has clearly provided the image on 
the license plate because the plates are issued by the state. Under the Lemon 
test, the license plate would most likely not be a violation of the 
Establishment Clause because the government did not have an improper 
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purpose in placing the image on the license plates; however, it could be 
argued that the artwork could be seen as having the effect of advancing the 
Native American religion and therefore fails the endorsement test. 
Challengers to these types of images on state paraphernalia would argue 
that by choosing Native American artwork with religious connotations, 
Oklahoma is essentially promoting or endorsing one religion to the 
detriment of other religions or non-religion, which would have the effect of 
making viewers feel like second-class citizens. 
The state would counter this argument by urging the court to also look at 
the context of the government action and decide from the viewpoint of a 
reasonable observer whether or not the images have the effect of endorsing 
religion. In Cressman’s case, Oklahoma has always used Native American 
images in its official state items for historical and cultural reasons, and 
since the reasonable observer has a reasonable memory, they would be well 
aware of this fact and probably assume Sacred Rain Arrow was displayed 
on the license plates to represent Oklahoma’s strong Native American 
culture. Similarly, the reasonable observer may not have knowledge of the 
origins of Sacred Rain Arrow, and will probably not associate the image 
with any type of religion.  
State officials could also argue that since Native American culture is tied 
so closely with religion, if the court were to find that the Sacred Rain 
Arrow artwork violated the Establishment Clause, it would effectively put 
into question all Native American images used by the state which should be 
protected as a long standing tradition of the states. This argument has 
persuaded the Court before in cases like Van Orden, but it has also failed in 
other cases, such as Lee v. Weisman.186 
The challenged practice before the Court in Lee was the delivering of 
prayers by members of the clergy during graduation ceremonies for public 
middle schools and high schools in Providence, Rhode Island.187 During the 
specific middle school graduation ceremony analyzed by the Court, a rabbi 
was invited to deliver the prayers.188 The rabbi was given a guide to 
administering the prayers, which suggested the prayers be drafted with 
“inclusiveness and sensitivity.”189 The principal of the middle school also 
recommended to the rabbi that the prayers be nonsectarian.190 
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The family protesting the prayer sought a permanent injunction against 
the Providence public school system to bar it from inviting clergy in the 
future to deliver prayers at invocation ceremonies, and the district court 
granted the injunction.191 The district court came to its conclusion by 
applying the Lemon test, and finding that the school system failed the 
second prong of the test because the prayers gave the appearance or had the 
effect of advancing religion.192 The First Circuit affirmed on appeal, and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.193 
In its analysis, the Court first looked at the involvement of the school in 
the prayers. The Court explained that the issue was not whether the school 
made an effort for the prayer to be acceptable to most people, but rather the 
legitimacy of the school involving itself with the administration of the 
prayer when it was to be used “in a formal religious exercise which 
students, for all practical purposes, are obliged to attend.”194 The Supreme 
Court found that the involvement of the school resulted in the “imprint of 
the State” on the prayers; the Court then examined the position the prayers 
placed students in.195 The Court recognized that there was high public and 
peer pressure on students to stand or be respectful during the prayers, and 
that this pressure was as compelling as requiring the students to 
participate.196 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that placing middle and 
high school students in this position was inconsistent with the 
Establishment Clause, and affirmed the First Circuit’s ruling.197 
Even though in Lee the Court found the time-honored practice of prayers 
at public middle and high school graduations unconstitutional, in the case of 
Native American imagery the Court is more likely to analogize to Van 
Orden. The Native American symbols are even more passive than the Texas 
monument in Van Orden because they are not overtly religious or as widely 
recognized as the Ten Commandments, and are vastly different than school 
prayer because the symbols do not result in peer or public pressure on 
citizens to conform with a religious exercise. Similar to the Ten 
Commandments, which have been used in various governmental property, 
these types of Native American images have been used for hundreds of 
years by many states, not just Oklahoma. 
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The Supreme Court would probably not find the Sacred Rain Arrow 
artwork used on the Oklahoma license plate an infringement of the 
Establishment Clause because the government’s motive in selecting the 
image was for tourism reasons and for furthering the view of Oklahoma as 
“Native-America”; the image does not have the effect of advancing or 
inhibiting religion because of the subtlety of the religious connotations. The 
reasonable observer would not view the images as government endorsement 
or disapproval of religion because they have a reasonable memory of our 
nation’s history in using these depictions in various official paraphernalia.  
However, this does not mean that all Native American artwork used by 
states would pass constitutional muster under the Establishment Clause. If 
states were to use Native American images in their official memorabilia 
that had overt religious attributes, especially qualities that would easily be 
recognized by the public as religious, these depictions would be a violation 
of the Establishment Clause if citizens felt like those religious qualities 
were being promoted over their own religion or lack of religion. States can 
avoid Establishment Clause problems with respect to using Native 
American imagery by acting with a secular purpose; Establishment Clause 
violations could also be minimized by the states use of artwork that would 
be viewed overall as contributing to the recognition of the Native American 
culture and history of the state instead of using images that would primarily 
have the effect of advancing or endorsing religion. By carefully selecting 
the Native American depictions used, states should be able to avoid 
stepping outside the boundaries of the Establishment Clause; the more 
concerning issue for the courts will be compelled speech claims. 
IV. Balancing the Native American Culture of the States While Protecting 
the First Amendment Rights of the Citizens 
The district court reached the right decision in Cressman’s case by 
finding that the image did not violate his First Amendment rights. The use 
of Native American images by the states honors their Native American 
heritage; if these depictions are not used by the states, how will their 
citizens be reminded of the important role Native Americans have played in 
developing the United States? Today about only 0.7 percent of the 
American population, or less than two million people, are enrolled in 
Native American tribes.198 Because Native Americans comprise such a 
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small percentage of the population, taking away tributes by the states to the 
Native American people would further diminish the recognition of the 
importance of Native American culture. 
A. The Important Role Native Americans Have Played in Contributing to 
Past and Present American Culture 
The Native American people have had a lasting impact on American 
culture, whether the average citizen realizes it or not. Native Americans 
first grew many foods Americans eat today, including potatoes, beans, corn, 
peanuts, pumpkins, tomatoes, squash, peppers, nuts, melons and sunflower 
seeds.199 Native Americans even taught European settlers how to 
successfully farm these crops.200 Over 2,000 Native American words have 
influenced or developed words in the English language, such as barbecue, 
caribou, hammock, mahogany, and hurricane.201 During World War II, the 
Marines used the Navajo language as a code because of its tonal qualities 
that make it extremely difficult to decipher, and although the Japanese were 
able to understand codes used by the U.S. Army and Army Air Corps, they 
never understood the Navajo code talkers for the Marines.202 These Navajo 
code talkers served in all six Marine divisions, and participated in every 
assault orchestrated by the Marines in the Pacific from 1942 to 1945; 
because of the code’s success, it was not declassified until 1968.203  
Many state names are also derived from Native American words: 
Connecticut is a derivative of the Native American word “Quinnehtuqut” 
which means beside the long tidal river.204 Michigan means “great water” 
and is derived from the Native American word “Michigamea,” and 
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Oklahoma is a Choctaw word meaning “red people.”205 Altogether more 
than half of the states’ names, twenty-six, have some type of Native 
American origin.206 The United States even adopted the same symbol as the 
Iroquois Nation, the bald eagle.207 All of these examples of Native 
American influences exemplify how the history of the United States would 
be vastly different without the impact of the Native American people. 
B. Native American Images Used to Convey the Overall Historical and 
Cultural Influences of the Native American People Should Not Be 
Considered a Violation of the Citizens’ First Amendment Rights 
States are honoring the great influence Native American culture has had 
in shaping American history and culture by displaying these images; by 
establishing Oklahoma as “Native-America,” the state is showing pride in 
its history and respect to the Native American people. These are values that 
will be compromised by claims against imagery such as Sacred Rain 
Arrow, and the courts should be careful in their rulings. It must be 
recognized that not all Native American images have explicitly religious 
meanings; although Native Americans are a religious people, in most 
instances these types of pieces have much greater historical and cultural 
weight than religious. 
As long as the predominant message of such artwork is not religious, the 
government should not be in danger of violating the Establishment Clause 
or compelled speech doctrine. The states’ purposes are not to promote or 
endorse the Native American religion, but rather to honor the states’ past 
and to remember the contributions made by the Native Americans. If the 
states’ intentions are not to endorse one religion over another, and if no one 
is made to feel like a second-class citizen because of the images, the states 
will be safely within the limits of the Establishment Clause. States should 
be able to continue using Native American artwork on government property 
without violating the Establishment Clause; by maintaining a secular 
purpose in using these images that do not have primarily religious 
messages, the states can create a harmony between the First Amendment 
concerns and Native American depictions. 
Similarly, with compelled speech cases the courts should look at whether 
the prevalent message of the artwork is ideological, or if the artwork is 
merely expressing the overall culture of the Native Americans. In 
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Cressman’s case, although the story behind the image does have some 
religious meaning, the image was used on the Oklahoma license plate 
because it was thought to be a representation of the state and its Native 
American influences. The state was probably aware of the inspiration for 
the artist who created Sacred Rain Arrow, but recognized that its overall 
message was promoting Native American culture. Upon first examination 
of the sculpture, there is nothing that seems to indicate that it has religious 
meaning, unless it is to be assumed that all Native American artwork has 
religious connotations. 
In the other compelled speech cases set out above, the messages being 
protested against were explicitly against the claimants’ beliefs. In Hurley, 
the responding organization was created primarily out of spite against the 
petitioner, and applied to march in the petitioner’s parade. The respondents 
were hoping for the petitioner to be forced to allow the organization in 
whose messages it did not believe into the parade to express those views to 
the public, which would associate the petitioner with the message. In 
Wooley, the message opposed by the Maynards was explicitly written, 
“Live Free or Die,” on their license plate. These two cases are acutely 
different than Cressman because there was such a clear message being 
emitted in both. In Cressman’s case, and in others concerning the use by 
states of Native American images with religious connotations, the courts 
should find that there is no recovery under the compelled speech doctrine 
because of the overpowering cultural and historical significance of these 
images. 
Conclusion 
The Native American influences in the culture and history of the United 
States are something to be proud of and represented to the public like so 
many states do today. Although states have to be careful not to infringe on 
any First Amendment constitutional protections, the states should be 
allowed to continue to use these images and to honor the Native American 
people. By acting with only the purpose to show pride in their rich tribal 
heritage, and by using images that do not have overt religious meanings, the 
states should be able to balance the constitutional interests of their citizens 
while respecting all that the Native Americans have done for the United 
States. These images preserve our Nation’s history, and will serve as a 
reminder of the importance of Native American culture for generations to 
come. 
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